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A Modest Practitioner Proposal: Striking a
Balance in Whistleblower Lawsuits
Lisa M. Nollert
One of the questions posed by the participants in this "Com-
bating Corruption" Symposium is whether law enforcement has
responded to changing economic times and motives by bringing a
greater number of prosecutions for activities that occurred dur-
ing the financial crisis. The more accurate question might be why
the public perceives inadequate prosecution rates when lawsuits
brought by whistleblowers are at an all-time high. Indeed, now
that Congress has expanded the relators' toolkit to include an
emboldened False Claims Act (FCA) and new whistleblower pro-
visions in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), wrongdoers should expect conse-
quences for acting corruptly. Those engaged in fraud and abuse
should now expect not only to repay the government, but also to
pay millions of dollars in bounties to private citizen whistleblow-
ers, most of whom suffered no losses of their own. In addition to
these statutory changes, tough economic times have provided
further incentives for whistleblowers to come forward; having
already been laid off by the targets of their lawsuits, many whis-
tieblowers have nothing to lose.
Though it is critically important that the government uncov-
er and recover corruptly obtained payments, increased efforts by
whistleblowers have produced some shameful instances of over-
reaching by law enforcement.' Whistleblower lawsuits are in-
t Partner, Foley & Lardner LLP; Lecturer in Law, The University of Chicago Law
School. The author previously served for ten years as an Assistant US Attorney in the
Northern District of Illinois.
1 For example, recent prosecutions for health care offenses have expanded so greatly
that toward the end of an investigation prompted by a whistleblower, the Department of
Justice in 2010 charged an in-house lawyer with obstructing justice and lying to the gov-
ernment, when she had lawfully relied on the advice of counsel during a qui tam investi-
gation. United States v Stevens, 771 F Supp 2d 556, 558-60 (D Md 2011). The suit against
Stevens was dismissed at the close of the government's case. See Antonia F. Giuliana,
Former GSK In-House Counsel Lauren Stevens Acquitted, FCA Alert (Kelley Drye & War-
ren LLP May 10, 2011), online at http://www.fcaalert.com/2011/05/articles/former-gsk-
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creasingly touted and have largely expanded unchecked, but
cause such perverse incentives that they should be reined in im-
mediately. The steadily increasing number of FCA and Dodd-
Frank actionS2 brought by "relators," many of whom are disgrun-
tled employees and former employees, have unnecessarily divert-
ed scarce resources without netting a full recovery for the federal
fisc, since the government is required by statute to share a por-
tion of all recoveries with the relator. While the government
should continue its vigilant investigation of fraud and abuse of
taxpayer dollars, whistleblower statutes should be tailored to
encourage reporting while avoiding unnecessary windfalls.
Perhaps instead of asking why too few individuals are being
prosecuted for fraud, we should be challenging the statutory
framework available to whistleblowers, which provides a wind-
fall to uninjured private citizens while denying prosecutors and
law enforcement officers the full breadth of available resources to
silence the public outcry and to deter others in any appreciable
way. Part I of this Article reviews the history of the FCA and the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions, including the govern-
ment's expanding focus and increasing collections. Part II argues
that the FCA and Dodd-Frank, while laudable in their pursuit of
justice, are not the most efficacious use of taxpayer money. Part
II also argues that lowering incentives for relators (including
utilizing internal reporting and collaboration with compliance
officers) and increasing law enforcement resources would pro-
duce the same result-only more efficiently.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FCA AND THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
A. The FCA
Hardly a day proceeds without a government press release
trumpeting a significant FCA settlement among the government,
a relator-plaintiff, and an entity or individual that allegedly
inhouse-counsel-lauren-stevens-acquitted/ (visited Sept 10, 2012) (reporting that the
presiding judge "believe[d] that it would be a miscarriage of justice to permit th[e] case to
go to the jury"). In other investigations, corporations have reached multimillion dollar
settlements, but executives have been pursued for misdemeanors for simply being "re-
sponsible corporate officers" or, in other words, persons in positions in which they are
assumed to "know better." See, for example, David Voreacos and Janelle Lawrence,
Health Care Prosecution Losses Mar U.S. Marketing Probe, Bloomberg Businessweek
(Bloomberg 2012), online at http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-14/health-care-
prosecution-losses-mar-u-dot-s-dot-marketing-probe#p1 (visited Sept 10, 2012).
2 For statistics reflecting this increase, see Part IC.
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submitted millions of dollars in false claims to the government to
obtain money or property to which the individual or entity was
not entitled. Before discussing a brief history of the Act and sug-
gesting ideas for improvement, it is worth noting that the aims of
the FCA are laudable. In remarks to Congress in 1998, a high-
ranking supervisor in the Department of Health and Human
Services explained the importance of the FCA:
The False Claims Act is an invaluable tool in the Gov-
ernment's continuing effort to control health care fraud
and abuse. In an era when the long-term solvency of Med-
icare is in doubt, and when our audits reveal huge losses
due to improper payments, and when taxpayers, the Con-
gress, and the Administration are rightfully demanding a
more concerted law enforcement effort, it would not be
wise to weaken the protections afforded by the False
Claims Act.3
Those words ring true today. Due to scarce Department of
Justice (DOJ) resources, the government is unlikely to uncover
on its own the extent of fraud that can be exposed by private at-
torneys general. Indeed, as this Article notes in Part IC, the fed-
eral government has recovered over $30 billion since the FCA
was amended and expanded in 1986. Nonetheless, this "success"
can have unintended and undesirable consequences: relators
have gotten rich, while the government remains poor. Under-
standing the perverse incentive structure requires a brief histor-
ical overview.
1. The current statute.
The current version of the federal4 FCA imposes civil liabil-
ity on any person who knowingly presents or causes to be pre-
sented a "false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" or
"knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false
record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim,"
3 Impact of Health Care Initiative on Hospitals, Hearings on the False Claims Act
before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims of the House Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 105th Cong, 2d Sess (1998) (testimony of Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General
for Legal Affairs in the Office of Inspector General, US Department of Health and Human
Services) (available on Westlaw at 1998 WL 792279). Mr. Morris was Chief Counsel to the
Inspector General for the Department of Health and Human Services until April 1, 2012.
4 Most states also have enacted provisions similar to the FCA. This article focuses
only on the federal statute.
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among other acts.5 The penalty for violating the FCA is steep:
civil liability of $5,500 to $11,000 per false claim, plus three
times the amount of damages that the government recovers
based on the false claim, and any penalties and interest.6 A claim
is broadly defined to include any request or demand for money or
property presented to a government agent.7 To encourage private
citizens to bring fraud to the government's attention, plaintiff-
whistleblowers, dubbed "relators," may "bring a civil action for
violations of section 3729 for the person and for the United
States Government," even though the private citizen has suffered
no damages of his own.8
To proceed, the relator files a lawsuit with a court under seal
and provides a copy to the government.9 The US Attorney's Office
in the district where the suit was brought or the DOJ then has
sixty days (or more, for good cause shown) 10 to decide whether to
intervene in the lawsuit and pursue the claim alongside the rela-
tor.11 If the government elects to intervene, the relator passively
remains part of the suit as a qui tam plaintiff, yet the govern-
ment lawyers lead the litigation, including all discovery, motion
practice, and trial.12 If the government elects not to intervene in
the lawsuit for any reason (including its lack of merit or an in-
credible relator), the relator may proceed on his own.13
The FCA incentivizes private citizens to bring fraud to the
attention of the government by providing that a successful rela-
tor may recover a bounty, a portion of the government's recovery
now ranging from 15 to 25 percent of the damages and penalties,
5 31 USC § 3729(a)(1).
6 28 CFR 85.3(a)(9) (adjusting dollar amounts contained in 31 USC § 3729(a)(1)(G)
for inflation). For example, if a physician routinely submitted bills for services requiring a
forty-minute patient visit, but only provided a thirty-minute patient visit, the value of the
false claim to the government is measured by the difference in reimbursement rates for
the two options, multiplied by the number of times he provided the shorter visit. The
government could also recover $5,500 to $11,000 per claim, plus penalties and interest on
the money. For a brief summary of the allegations involved in the twenty-two largest
FCA settlements according to a watchdog group, see Taxpayers Against Fraud, Top
Fraud Cases (The False Claims Act Legal Center), online at http: //www.taf.org/fraud-
cases (visited Sept 10, 2012). Of the twenty-two cases identified in the article, nineteen of
them alleged health care fraud.
31 USC § 3729(b)(2).
31 USC § 3730(b)(1).
31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
10 31 USC § 3730(b)(3).
11 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
12 See 31 USC § 3730(c).
13 See 31 USC § 3730(c).
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at the government's discretion and as approved by the court. 14
Successful qui tam relators may also recover all costs, expenses,
and attorneys' fees, which the defendant must pay. 15
2. "Lincoln's Law."
Congress enacted the FCA in 1863 in response to enterpris-
ing fraudsters who took advantage of the government's wartime
expenditures. During the Civil War, the government's resources
were strapped and it relied on the private marketplace to obtain
items ranging from guns and ammunition to horses and medi-
cine. Corrupt businessmen took advantage of the government by
charging artificially high prices for goods and services, delivering
low-quality items, and billing multiple times for the same prod-
uct.1 6 The FCA replaced two entities. The first, the President's
Committee on the Conduct of the War, was a group of politicians
charged with unearthing waste and corruption, but which also
"muddled, accused men wrongly, roused fear and suspicion, and
left ranklings."17 The second, the Congressional Committee on
Government Contracts, was also charged with identifying and
pursuing those who defrauded the government. In a December
1861 report to Congress, the Congressional Committee wrote,
"even in this time of trial, cheating in clothes, blankets, flour,
bread, everything, is universal."' One businessman agreed,
bragging, "[y]ou can sell anything to the government at almost
any price you've got the guts to ask."19 The committees monitored
profiteering and publicly derided those who plundered the treas-
ury; however, it was not until Congress passed the FCA in 1863
that penalties for government fraud were codified.
The original FCA outlawed defrauding the government and
provided a civil penalty of double the amount of damages suf-
fered by the government, plus a $2,000 forfeiture by the wrong-
doer for each false claim submitted. 20 Under the original FCA,
14 31 USC § 3730(d).
15 31 USC § 3730(d).
16 See Jonathan T. Brollier, Note, Mutiny of the Bounty: A Moderate Change in the
Incentive Structure of Qui Tam Actions Brought Under the False Claims Act, 67 Ohio St L
J 693, 699 (2006).
17 Carl Sandburg, Abraham Lincoln, The Prairie Years and the War Years 273 (Mari-
ner 2002).
18 Id at 278.
19 Id.
20 See An Act to prevent and punish Frauds upon the Government of the United
States ("False Claims Act of 1863"), 12 Stat 696, 696-98 (1863); Daniel C. Lumm, Com-
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any person could submit a lawsuit on behalf of the government
alleging that someone had submitted a false claim for money or
property and then reap up to 50 percent of any award. 21 These
private parties, called relators, could stand in the government's
stead in what was labeled a qui tam action, short for the Latin
phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte
sequitur, meaning "who as well for the king as for himself sues in
this matter."22 The original FCA also criminalized the submis-
sion of false claims to the federal government, a provision later
severed and codified separately.23
3. Amendments to the FCA.
The statute remained virtually unchanged until 1943, when
Congress overhauled the FCA in response to a case then before
the Supreme Court, United States v Hess.24 In Hess, the relator
filed a civil suit based upon a previously returned indictment of
Hess for collusively bidding state contracts partially funded with
federal money. 25 The Supreme Court upheld a lower court award
to the relator, despite that he had no original information about
the fraud. 26 In response to Hess, Congress revised the statute to
increase government oversight of qui tam suits and reduced the
relator's share of the recovery to 25 percent if the government
declined to intervene and to 10 percent if the government pur-
sued the case. 27 Congress also prohibited qui tam suits based on
information already in the government's possession. 28
ment, The 2009 Clarifications to the False Claims Act of 1863: The All-Purpose Antifraud
Statute with the Fun Qui Tam Twist, 45 Wake Forest L Rev 527, 528 (2010).
21 False Claims Act of 1863 § 6, 12 Stat at 698.
22 Black's Law Dictionary defines a qui tam action as:
an action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a penalty
for the commission or omission of a certain act, and provides that the same
shall be recoverable in a civil action, part of the penalty to go to any person who
will bring such action and the remainder to the state or some other institution.
Black's Law Dictionary 1251 (West 6th ed 1990).
23 See Sikkenga v Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 472 F3d 702, 733-34 (10th
Cir 2006) (discussing FCA history); United States v Niefert-White Co, 390 US 228, 230 n 3
(1968) (explaining that the FCA's criminal provisions are now codified at 18 USC §§ 287,
1001).
24 317 US 537 (1943).
25 Id at 539.
26 Id at 545.
27 Lumm, Comment, 45 Wake Forest L Rev at 529 (cited in note 20).
28 Id. This "public disclosure" bar is codified at 31 USC § 3730(e)(4)(A).
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In response to the 1943 amendments, courts interpreted the
narrower FCA as prohibiting all qui tam suits where the gov-
ernment already was aware of the alleged fraud, even where the
government knew of the fraud because of the relator's infor-
mation.2 9 Not surprisingly, this resulted in fewer FCA lawsuits,
since relators were legally required to be the only source of the
information presented to support their lawsuits.30 Congress
reacted in 1986 with sweeping changes to the FCA.3a It amended
the statute to include increased damages (including treble dam-
ages and greater penalties), a lesser standard of scienter (impos-
ing liability for "reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the
claim," in addition to actual knowledge), and a greater bounty for
the relator.32 The 1986 amendments also clarified the "original
source" doctrine, allowed relators to sue for "knowing" violations
of the statute as well as a reckless disregard for the truth or fal-
sity of the claim, and greatly expanded incentives for whistle-
blowers, increasing the amount of recovery to $5,000 to $10,000
per claim. 33 Congressional comments reflect that the 1986
amendments were added to encourage "private individuals who
are aware of fraud being perpetrated against the Government to
bring such information forward."34
Reviews of the 1986 FCA amendments allege the changes
were spurred by widespread fraud by defense contractors who
took advantage of increased defense spending during the Cold
War.35 Notably, though the 1986 amendments increased the fi-
nancial incentives for private persons to bring FCA lawsuits and
29 See, for example, State of Wisconsin v Dean, 729 F2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir 1984)
(holding that even though the relator, the state of Wisconsin, had uncovered Medicaid
fraud, it could not pursue a qui tam suit because the federal government previously had
learned of the fraud when Wisconsin reported it as required by regulation).
30 See Brollier, Note, 67 Ohio St L J at 694 (cited in note 16) (noting that before 1986,
citizens filed an average of six qui tam lawsuits per year).
-' See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-562, 100 Stat 3153
(1986), codified at 31 USC §§ 3729-31.
32 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 §§ 2, 3, 100 Stat at 3153-57.
3 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986 §§ 2, 3, 100 Stat at 3153-57.
34 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, HR Rep No 99-660, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 22
(1986). See also False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, S Rep No 99-345, 99th Cong, 2d
Sess 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 USCCAN 5266, 5266-67 (stating that the amendments
are meant "to encourage any individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that in-
formation forward").
3 See, for example, Lumm, Comment, 45 Wake Forest L Rev at 529 (cited in note
20). See also James Fairhall, The Case for the $435 Hammer: Investigation of Pentagon's
Procurement, Washington Monthly 47 (Jan 1987); Charles Thompson and Tony Hayes,
Gore Brings Back the $640 Toilet Seat (World Net Daily Oct 27, 2000), online at
http://www.wnd.com/2000/10/4314/ (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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expanded their ability to do so, Congress also did not increase
funding for the DOJ to review, analyze, and litigate these ac-
tions. In other words, Congress chose to respond to increased
fraud by focusing greater attention on private enforcement
methods.
Congress most recently expanded the scope of the FCA
through enactment of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act
of 2009 (FERA).36 Among other changes, FERA expanded the
FCA to impose liability for "reverse false claims"-false state-
ments made to avoid paying an obligation to the government 37 -
to broaden antiretaliation provisions allowing recovery by con-
tractors and agents, and to expand "retaliation" to include nega-
tivity in the terms and conditions of employment.38
FERA also gave the DOJ the authority to use Civil Investi-
gative Demands (CIDs) to investigate matters, including FCA
cases, prior to filing suit. 3 9 The government may now issue a CID
to anyone who the government has reason to believe may be "in
possession, custody, or control of any documentary material or
information relevant to a false claims law investigation." 4 0 This
power has been delegated to all US Attorney's Offices, allowing
Assistant US Attorneys (AUSAs) to obtain sworn testimony, doc-
uments, and interrogatory responses from individuals prior to
the government's filing of a lawsuit.4 1 Giving the government
this power enables it to rely even less on the allegations made by
relators, since prosecutors can develop their own information to
corroborate allegations. After the introduction of the CID pro-
cess, a relator is even less involved in the investigation of his
own lawsuit, yet his potential financial reward remains the
same.
36 Pub L No 111-21, 123 Stat 1617 (2009), codified in various sections of Titles 18 and
31.
3 FERA § 4, 123 Stat at 1621, codified at 31 USC § 3729(a)(7).
38 FERA § 4, 123 Stat at 1621, codified at 31 USC § 3730(h).
39 FERA § 4, 123 Stat at 1621, codified at 31 USC § 3733(a)(1).
40 FERA § 4, 123 Stat at 1621, codified at 31 USC § 3733(a)(1).
41 28 CFR Part 0, Subpart Y, Appendix § 5 ("Authority relating to Civil Investigative
Demands issued under the False Claims Act is hereby delegated to United States Attor-
neys in cases that are delegated or assigned as monitored to their respective compo-
nents.").
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B. Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions
In response to the financial crisis that began in 2008, Con-
gress enacted Dodd-Frank,42 to "Create a Sound Economic Foun-
dation to Grow Jobs, Protect Consumers, Rein in Wall Street and
Big Bonuses, End Bailouts and Too Big to Fail, [and to] Prevent
Another Financial Crisis."43 The legislation addressed many is-
sues, but relevant to this Article are those Dodd-Frank provi-
sions colloquially known as the "Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Pro-
visions." In August 2011, Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) commissioners announced final rule changes to the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),44 which changes
implemented the whistleblower program Congress prescribed in
Dodd-Frank.45 While the SEC had announced proposed rules in
November 2010, the Commission sought input during the notice
and comment period and business and legal communities lobbied
the SEC for further support of internal compliance programs. In
particular, businesses and lawyers sought a requirement that a
relator first inform his employer's compliance departments be-
fore filing a claim with the SEC. As a result, the SEC made
slight modifications to the proposed rules to incentivize internal
reporting.
Section 922 of Dodd-Frank added new Rule 21F to the Ex-
change Act, titled "Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Pro-
tection."46 Patterned after the FCA, Rule 21F directs the SEC to
pay awards to whistleblowers who: (i) voluntarily provide the
SEC; (ii) with original information; (iii) that leads to the success-
ful enforcement by the SEC of a federal court or administrative
action; (iv) where the SEC obtains monetary sanctions totaling
more than $1 million. 47 The SEC's formal announcement trum-
peted Rule 21F as a program "primarily intended to reward indi-
42 Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010).
43 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Brief Summary of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act *1 (Jul 1, 2010), online at
http: /fbanking.senate.gov/public/ files/0701 10 DoddFrankWallStreet Reform compre
hensive summaryFinal.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
44 Pub L 73-291, 48 Stat 881 (1934), codified at 15 USC §§ 78(a) et seq.
45 See generally SEC, Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, SEC Re-
lease No 34-64545 (May 25, 2011) (available on Westlaw at 2011 WL 2045853). The Dodd-
Frank whistleblower provisions are codified in the Exchange Act at 15 USC § 78u-6.
6 17 CFR §§ 240.21F-1-240.21F-12. See also Dodd-Frank § 922, 124 Stat at 1841,
codified at 15 USC § 78u-6.
7 15 USC § 78u-6(a)(1), (b)(1).
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
viduals who act early to expose violations and who provide signif-
icant evidence that helps the SEC bring successful cases."4 8
Rule 21F-2(a) and the accompanying regulations define a
whistleblower as follows: "You are a whistleblower if, alone or
jointly with others, you provide the Commission with infor-
mation . .. [that] relates to a possible violation of the Federal
securities laws."49 A whistleblower must be an individual; a com-
pany or another entity is not eligible to receive a whistleblower
award.50 Rule 21F-8 sets forth categories of individuals who are
ineligible to receive a whistleblower award, including: employees
of regulatory or self-regulatory agencies, the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board, and law enforcement agencies; in-
dividuals convicted of a criminal violation related to the Com-
mission's action; persons who obtained the information through
an audit of a company's financial statements; and, individuals
who knowingly made false statements or representations in con-
nection with their dealings with law enforcement or the SEC.5 1
In short, while the whistleblower can be almost any individual
with a hunch that a violation of the securities laws has been
committed, he cannot be an individual trying to turn corporate
compliance into financial gain, purely for gain's sake. However,
otherwise exempt persons such as compliance and audit person-
nel may become whistleblowers where: disclosure may prevent
substantial injury to the entity or to investors; the entity is en-
gaging in conduct that will impede an investigation; or, at least
120 days have elapsed since the company became aware of a
whistleblower complaint.52
Rule 21F-5 states that, if all conditions are met, the SEC
will pay an award of at least 10 percent and not more than 30
percent of the total monetary sanctions collected in successful
SEC and related actions. 53 The rules permit the SEC to aggre-
gate multiple SEC cases arising out of a common set of facts as a
single action. 54 In response to comments made on the proposed
48 SEC, Press Release, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish Whistleblower Program (May
25, 2011), online at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm (visited Sept 10,
2012).
4 17 CFR § 240.21F-2(a) (emphasis added). This definition is broader than the FCA's
definition, since it includes relators who suspect a "possible" violation of the securities
laws.
50 17 CFR § 240.21F-2(a).
11 17 CFR § 240.21F.8(c).
52 See SEC, Press Release, SEC Adopts Rules (cited in note 48).
53 17 CFR § 240.21F-5(c).
54 See 17 CFR § 241.21F-5(c).
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rules, the final 21F-5 rules also provide that when determining
the amount of an award, a whistleblower's voluntary participa-
tion in a company's internal compliance and reporting systems is
a factor that can increase the amount of an award and that a
whistleblower's interference with internal compliance and re-
porting is a factor that can decrease the amount of an award.55
Rule 21F-6 provides that, in considering the amount of an
award, the SEC will consider: (1) the significance of the infor-
mation provided to the success of the SEC action or related ac-
tion; (2) the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower
and his or her legal representatives in the SEC action or related
action; (3) the SEC's "programmatic interest" in deterring viola-
tions of the securities laws by making whistleblower awards;
and, (4) whether an award otherwise enhances the SEC's ability
to enforce the federal securities laws, protect investors, and en-
courage the submission of high-quality information by future
whistleblowers.5 6 Awards will vary based on the Commission's
assessment of these factors.57
The final Rule 21F Exchange Act rules do not require whis-
tleblowers first to report violations internally to qualify for a
bounty. But to slightly incentivize potential whistleblowers to
work with their employers' compliance departments, the rules:
(1) do not preclude recovery for whistleblowers who report viola-
tions to the company, if the company then self-reports to the
SEC; (2) allow recovery for whistleblowers who report to the SEC
and their employer at the same time; and, (3) provide that whis-
tleblowers' voluntary participation in their employers' internal
reporting system may increase a whistleblower's award.58 In re-
sponse to comments made by corporate compliance personnel
and the legal community, the final rule extends the time period
during which a whistleblower who reports to the Commission
after first reporting internally receives "credit" as if he or she
had reported to the Commission on the date of the internal re-
porting, from 90 to 120 days.5 9
55 See 17 CFR § 240.21F-6(a)(4),(b)(3).
56 17 CFR § 240.21F-6.
57 See 17 CFR § 240.21F-6.
58 17 CFR § 240.21F-6. See also SEC, Press Release, SEC Adopts Rules (cited in note
48).
59 See 17 CFR § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(C).
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C. Record-High Recoveries from Record-High Lawsuits
1. The bountiful FCA.
On December 19, 2011, in the year of the twenty-fifth anni-
versary of the 1986 amendments to the FCA, the DOJ announced
it had recovered a record $3 billion in FCA cases in fiscal year
2011.60 It was the second year in a row the DOJ collected over $3
billion, bringing the total recovered since January 2009 to $8.7
billion.61 In a press release, the DOJ noted that amounts recov-
ered included $2.8 billion under the whistleblower provisions of
the FCA and $30 billion under the FCA since the 1986 amend-
ments. Assistant Attorney General Tony West proclaimed that,
"Twenty-eight percent of the recoveries in the last 25 years were
obtained since President Obama took office,"62 a steep increase in
a short amount of time. The DOJ's announcement also noted that
since the 1986 amendments, relators have filed more than 7,800
qui tam lawsuits, 638 of which were filed in 2011.63 West also
highlighted that the government obtained significant recoveries
from a few large settlements, including $900 million from eight
drug manufacturers and $750 million from GlaxoSmithKline. 64
The announcement also touted twenty-one criminal convictions
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.65 While at first glance
this number seems small by comparison, many of these twenty-
one convictions likely were of executives convicted under the ex-
panding Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, which holds
executives responsible for failing to prevent fraud committed by
those who work for a company.66
According to fraud statistics maintained by the DOJ, in
2011, the relators' share of the $3 billion in fraud recovery to-
taled $532,193,735, or 17.5 percent of all recoveries.67 Of the
60 DOJ, Press Release, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion in False Claims Act
Cases in Fiscal Year 2011 (Dec 19, 2011), online at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/




64 DOJ, Press Release, Justice Department Recovers $3 Billion (cited in note 60).
65 Id.
66 The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine is codified at 21 USC § 331, and its
misdemeanor provisions were upheld in United States v Park. 421 US 658 (1975) (uphold-
ing a corporate officer's misdemeanor conviction despite delegation of oversight, because
in his position, he was responsible for all acts of the corporation).
67 DOJ, Fraud Statistics-Overview (Dec 2011), online at http://www.justice.gov/civill
does forms/C-FRAUDS FCAStatistics.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
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more than $30 billion recovered since 1986, relators have pocket-
ed $3,418,672,503, or slightly more than 11 percent of all mon-
ey. 68 As an example of a relator's recovery, in one 2010 case, Al-
lergan settled a qui tam suit in which the relators alleged the
company had promoted Botox for headaches, pain, spasticity, and
cerebral palsy, none of which was a use approved by the Food
and Drug Administration. 69 The relators and their attorneys re-
ceived $37.8 million to cover their bounty, legal costs, and ex-
penses. 70 Assuming the lawyers representing the individual rela-
tors had typical contingent fee contracts (in other words, con-
tracts which allowed them to recover 25 to 33 percent of their
clients' awards), the attorneys received $9.45 to $12.47 million,
despite that the government intervened and performed the lion's
share of the work litigating the case.
Relators' success is largely correlated to whether the gov-
ernment intervenes in an FCA suit. Since 1987, the average an-
nual intervention rate has been 22 percent. In the 1,300 cases in
which the DOJ has intervened, 95 percent of those cases settled
or received a favorable judgment for the relators. By contrast, of
the approximately 4,000 cases in which the DOJ declined to in-
tervene, courts dismissed 94 percent.71 In the remaining 6 per-
cent of non-intervention cases, the average settlement was $13.3
million lower.72 It typically takes the DOJ thirteen months to
evaluate a qui tam lawsuit and to decide whether to intervene on
the relator's behalf.73 During this time, AUSAs must prioritize
these cases ahead of others (regardless of the relative merit of
each) because the FCA requires an intervention decision be made
within sixty days of filing suit, unless the court grants an exten-
sion of time for good cause. 74
68 Id.
69 DOJ, Press Release, Allergan Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $600 million to Re-
solve Allegations of Off-Label Promotion of Botox (Sept 1, 2010), online at http://
www.justice.gov/opalpr/2010/September/10-civ-988.html (visited Sept 10, 2012).
70 Id.
71 DOJ, Fraud Statistics-Overview (cited in note 67).
72 Id. The average recovery in intervention cases was $15.6 million, versus $2.3 mil-
lion in non-intervention cases.
7 See Jim Esquea and Ronald Weich, Letter to Senator Charles E. Grassley (Jan 24,
2011), online at http://www.fcaalert.com/uploads/file/DOJ-HHS-joint-letter-to-Grassley
[1].pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
7 See 31 USC § 3730(b)(2).
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2. The new kid on the block starts strong.
Section 924(d) of Dodd-Frank requires the SEC's Office of
the Whistleblower to report annually to Congress on whistle-
blower complaints and the Commission's responses. 5 In Novem-
ber 2011, the SEC issued its inaugural annual report on the
Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program. 6 Because the final rules
implementing the Dodd-Frank Act did not become effective until
August 12, 2011 and the SEC's fiscal year ended September 30,
2011, the report included only seven weeks of data and described
just 334 whistleblower submissions. The report listed eleven dif-
ferent complaint categories. The largest percentage of whistle-
blower submissions-25.2 percent-was identified as nondescript
"other" and "blank" violations. "Market Manipulation" comprised
16.2 percent of the submission complaints, followed by "Offering
Fraud" at 15.6 percent and "Corporate Disclosure & Financials"
at 15.3 percent.77 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act category,
which pundits have expected to comprise a significant portion of
whistleblower submissions under Dodd-Frank,78 accounted for
only 3.9 percent of the submissions.79 Though there is no pub-
lished data regarding recoveries, the fact that almost fifty people
a month have submitted claims to the SEC is an indication the
public is eager to collect the bounties the agency has offered.
On February 15, 2012, the director of the SEC's Regional Of-
fice in Boston reported that since the whistleblower provisions of
Dodd-Frank went into effect in August 2011, the SEC has been
receiving nearly seven tips a day.80 While he emphasized he was
not speaking on behalf of the agency as a whole, if these numbers
are correct, the rate of reporting has increased dramatically since
the 2011 annual report.
7 Dodd-Frank § 924(d), 124 Stat at 1850, codified at 15 USC § 78u-6(g)(5).
76 See SEC, Annual Report on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program, Fiscal Year
2011 (Nov 2011), online at http: /www.sec.gov/aboutloffices/owb/whistleblower-annual-
report-201 l.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
7 Id at 5.
7 See, for example, Matthey M. Nolan, Mark S. Radke, and Peter Unger, Fueling the
FCPA Fire: The Dodd-Frank Act Whistleblower Provisions (Arent Fox July 20, 2010),
online at http://www.arentfox.com/publicationstindex.cfm?fa=legalUpdateDisp&content
id=2565 (visited Sept 10, 2012).
7 SEC, Annual Report at 5 (cited in note 76).
s0 Martha Kessler, Whistleblowers: SEC Receiving Nearly Seven Tips Daily, Director
of Boston Regional Office Says, 44 BNA Sec Reg & L Rep 8 (Feb 20, 2012).
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II. STRIKING A BALANCE BY MODIFYING THE SIGNIFICANT
WINDFALLS TO BOUNTY HUNTERS
Avoid lawsuits beyond all things; they pervert your con-
science, impair your health, and dissipate your property.
Jean de la Bruybre81
A. Perverse Incentives
An appropriate, efficient enforcement scheme should incen-
tivize compliance at the lowest possible cost. If the crime rate on
Main Street were the same regardless of whether two or four po-
lice officers patrol the street, few would rationally urge the gov-
ernment to budget for four. However, the economics of whistle-
blower lawsuits defy such logical expenditures of public funds-a
relator is entitled to the same percentage recovery, regardless of
whether he has unearthed a false claim worth $1 or $1 million.
As one court has noted,
The history of the False Claims Act's qui tam provisions
demonstrates repeated attempts by Congress to balance
two competing policies. On the one hand, the qui tam pro-
visions seek to encourage "whistleblowers to act as pri-
vate attorneys-general" in bringing suits for the common
good. On the other, the provisions seek to discourage op-
portunistic plaintiffs from bringing parasitic lawsuits
whereby would-be relators merely feed off a previous dis-
closure of fraud.82
While this statement was made in the context of evaluating
the tension between the FCA and the public disclosure bar, the
same observation can be made regarding whistleblowers in gen-
eral: there is a tension between revealing fraud for the greater
good and revealing a suspicion of fraud, without regard to collat-
81 George Seldes, ed, The Great Quotations 395 (Lyle Stuart 1960).
82 Walburn v Lockheed Martin Corp, 431 F3d 966, 970 (6th Cir 2006) (citations omit-
ted). See also United States v Laboratory Corporation of America, Inc, 290 F3d 1301, 1313
n 24 (11th Cir 2002). The Eleventh Circuit explained:
When a plaintiff does not specifically plead the minimum elements of their alle-
gation, it enables them to learn the complaint's bare essentials through discov-
ery and may needlessly harm a defendants' goodwill and reputation by bringing
a suit that is, at best, missing some of its core underpinnings, and, at worst, are
baseless allegations used to extract settlements; this is especially so in cases in-
volving the False Claims Act.
Id.
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eral consequences, because it is an opportunity to get rich. If
whistleblowers were interested in reducing fraud, they could re-
port perceived wrongdoing to their supervisors, corporate com-
pliance officers, or in-house attorneys, all of whom know the per-
sonnel, industry, and law better than a federal law enforcement
officer or attorney. But the possibility of flat rate, million-dollar
recoveries must be too good to pass up and current and former
employees have too much to gain financially to act with principle
and principle alone.
Since the 1986 FCA amendments, the United States Sen-
tencing Commission and the DOJ have claimed that, when mak-
ing charging and settlement decisions relating to corporations,
the government will review and consider whether an entity un-
der scrutiny has a meaningful and effective compliance pro-
gram.8 3 The SEC, too, has claimed publicly that in deciding how
to penalize a corporation for wrongdoing, the Commission will
consider whether the entity has a preexisting culture of compli-
ance that encourages self-reporting and remediation when an
entity learns of wrongdoing. 84 These pronouncements are aligned
with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,85 which mandated that all
publicly traded companies must implement and maintain a
meaningful and effective compliance program to ensure compli-
ance with securities laws. The government's message is a clear
requirement that corporations should police themselves. This
carrot approach to enforcement makes sense in a competitive
marketplace; effective, proactive compliance should save money
by reducing lost profits resulting from corruption, the cost of liti-
gation, discipline of employees, and other costs associated with
crime. As one author has written, any such costs incurred by a
company-including negative publicity, lost shareholder value,
and attorneys' fees-will be paid by the public in the end, either
imposed on customers or the government itself.8 6
83 See, for example, DOJ, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
§ 9-28.300 at 3-5 (2008), online at http://www.justice.gov/opaldocuments/corp-charging-
guidelines.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012); US Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual
§§ 8B2.1, 8C2.5(f)at 512-17, 526 (Nov 1, 2011), online at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelines/
2011 Guidelines/Manual PDF/Chapter_8.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012).
8 See Enforcement Manual § 6.1.2 at 123-24 (SEC Mar 9, 2012), online at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012); SEC,
Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement
Decisions, SEC Release No 34-44969 (Oct 23, 2001) (available on Westlaw at 2001 WL
1301408).
85 Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745 (2002).
86 See Brollier, Note, 67 Ohio St L J at 706-07 (cited in note 16). See also Lumm,
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The notion of self-policing is not novel in and of itself; mar-
ket protagonists have touted it for years. The difference in the
whistleblower world is that companies have paid attention, and
since 1986, the law-abiding entities have taken significant steps
to avail themselves of the benefit of having an effective and
meaningful compliance program, should wrongdoing prevail de-
spite the presence of a robust program.87 In January 2011, the
Ethics Resource Center, the Ethics and Compliance Officers As-
sociation, and the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics
jointly released a report detailing the results from a survey of
1,223 ethics and compliance professionals whose companies had
implemented corporate compliance programs.88 An overwhelming
majority of the survey respondents-86.9 percent-report they
regularly provide ethics and compliance updates to corporate
leadership; 70 percent said they "always" or "sometimes" refer-
enced DOJ enforcement actions in delivering this message, in an
effort to reinforce the importance of corporate compliance with
the law.89 Compliance officers who did not report enforcement
decisions to their leadership indicated it was because they found
the DOJ website difficult to manage and they welcomed more
assistance from the government.90 Almost every person surveyed
responded that it would be beneficial if the DOJ specifically pub-
lished the benefits of effective compliance programs (in fewer
charges brought or settlements made), particularly as these pro-
grams factored into the government's decision making, and the
weight given to preexisting programs versus remediative ones.91
Compliance professionals largely agreed that if the DOJ would
share general statistics on the consideration given to ethics and
compliance programs in enforcement decisions, descriptions of
cases in which compliance programs were mitigating factors in
enforcement decisions, and information about the benefits of an
effective program, they could implement these considerations
Comment, 45 Wake Forest L Rev at 536 (cited in note 20) ("In all likelihood, the rational
company will reallocate costs by adjusting pricing structures and simply pass these costs
on to the eventual consumer.").
87 Of course, the primary reason to implement a compliance program is to encourage
a culture of compliance, ideally avoiding any repercussions from noncompliance.
88 See Keith Darcy, et al, The Release of Statistics on Ethics and Compliance Pro-
grams in Enforcement Decisions: A Joint Report to the U.S. Department of Justice (Ethics
Resource Center Jan 13, 2011), online at http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/FinalDOJ.pdf
(visited Sept 10, 2012).
8 Id at 4-5.
90 Id.
91 Id at 6.
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into their companies' programs, to the benefit of corporate com-
pliance in general.92 In sum, companies pay attention to govern-
ment enforcement actions and do their best to adapt by imple-
menting relevant modifications over time.
The increase in attention paid to corporate compliance is a
trend the DOJ and the SEC should encourage, as the costs of
compliance would be borne by the private sector rather than by
the public in the form of expensive government investigations
and litigation. Corporations forced to spend money to settle an
FCA lawsuit may draw that money from a compliance depart-
ment budget. And money spent on private enforcement is money
not paid to shareholders (including institutional shareholders
such as public pension funds). Unfortunately, the lure of FCA
and Dodd-Frank whistleblower lawsuits and multimillion dollar
recoveries undermines corporate compliance programs. Consider
the perverse incentives for a whistleblower: if he reports per-
ceived fraud internally, he may be heralded as a company hero
for doing the right thing, eliminating fraud and abuse and saving
the company the expense of a lengthy lawsuit. However, he is at
the same time passing up the opportunity to sue and recover mil-
lions of dollars without having to do much work other than watch
government attorneys do their jobs. In addition, antiretaliation
provisions in the FCA and Dodd-Frank ensure the whistleblower
can continue to draw a salary while snitching on his employer.
Not surprisingly, if one spends five minutes surfing the internet
for whistleblower counsel, one will see there are plenty of law-
yers vying for the opportunity to advise a whistleblower to sue
his employer-at a contingent fee of 25 to 30 percent of the re-
covery.
As the payments to whistleblowers increase, the strength of
even the best corporate compliance program diminishes, since
the company pays twice-once to establish a program it mean-
ingfully hopes will detect fraud and abuse and again when a
ne'er-do-well employee hell bent on corruption finds a loophole.
Public comments to the SEC in response to the first version
of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions encouraged the SEC
to partially remedy this issue by requiring whistleblowers to first
report their concerns internally and giving the company a dis-
crete amount of time to investigate and remediate the problem;
however, the final rules promulgated by the SEC did not include
this suggestion. Instead, the SEC opted for a structure that
92 Darcy, et al, Release of Statistics, at 6-7 (cited in note 88).
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merely encourages whistleblowers to report internally first, be-
cause the size of their awards will depend in part on whether
they first informed their companies. 93 Nonetheless, the SEC's
rules do not delineate how much credit a whistleblower may re-
ceive for internal reporting, and if he does inform his employer of
wrongdoing, he runs the risk that his employer will remediate
immediately, thus decreasing his chance at a loss of at least $1
million, the threshold required to bring a successful claim under
the Act.
B. A Modest Practitioner's Proposal
It is too bad the SEC missed an opportunity for a grand
whistleblower experiment. Encouraging a whistleblower to re-
port internally before filing a lawsuit would accomplish the goals
Judge Gibson announced in Walburn v Lockheed Martin Corpo-
ration:94 encouraging the common good while at the same time
discouraging opportunistic plaintiffs.95 I believe that by making
slight but necessary changes to the FCA and the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower provisions, fraud and abuse will be sufficiently
deterred, and those responsible for uncovering it will be suffi-
ciently rewarded for their efforts. These changes are meant to
supplement compliance programs, which I assume law-abiding
companies already will have implemented on their own, and will
further prevent wrongdoing through vigilance and remediation.
First, I recommend a cap on whistleblower recoveries. The
DOJ fraud statistics indicate there is no shortage of whistleblow-
ers and I believe they would not be deterred by the promise of a
smaller, yet still sizable, recovery in meritorious cases. The cap
could be accomplished by lowering the percentage of recovery
available to a relator, to a more reasonable 5 to 10 percent range
of the recovered monies, taking into consideration the effort ex-
pended by the relator, whether he suffered retaliation for his
whistleblowing, and the amount of money alleged and also recov-
ered by the government. Even awards in the low end of this
range would have reaped a bounty of $150,000,000 to whistle-
blowers since 1986, including a $3 million award to the Allergan
plaintiffs. In other words, 5 percent of fraud proceeds is still a
93 See 17 CFR § 240.21F-6(a)(4) (specifying that the SEC "will assess whether, and
the extent to which, the whistleblower and any legal representative of the whistleblower
participated in internal compliance systems").
94 431 F3d 966 (6th Cir 2005).
9 Id at 970.
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sizable bounty and certainly a strong incentive to do the right
thing. Moreover, any plaintiff insufficiently motivated by the po-
tential of a recovery of several hundred thousand or millions of
dollars (depending on the size of the fraud) is motivated more by
greed than by good faith and is only denying the government
monies which belonged to the federal treasury and not to the
plaintiff. Limiting the amount of money whistleblowers may re-
cover will increase the amount of money repaid to the govern-
ment, from whose coffers it came in the first place. This money
could be used to hire additional law enforcement personnel or
fund other worthy government antifraud programs.96 I would
also maintain the current state of the FCA and Dodd-Frank an-
tiretaliation provisions, which discourage employers from pun-
ishing those who first present their concerns to internal compli-
ance officers.
Second, Congress should amend the FCA and the Dodd-
Frank whistleblower provisions to include a jurisdictional re-
quirement that to recover any reward at all, relators must first
report fraud and abuse internally to a corporate compliance of-
ficer. This requirement is consistent with other agencies' re-
quirements that employees raise their concerns first through the
administrative process, then (on appeal) to the federal judicial
system.97 Requiring internal review will likely result in compa-
nies and whistleblowers identifying and remediating issues on
their own or through a coordinated and cooperative presentation
to the government. That should free DOJ and SEC resources
spent investigating the thousands of qui tam and Dodd-Frank
complaints filed and provide more time for law enforcement
agents and attorneys to intervene in more than the 22 percent of
cases in which they now elect to intervene.98 Imposing this juris-
96 In January 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder announced a hiring freeze and a
reduction in "non-essential" spending. See Eric Holder, Memorandum for all DOJ Em-
ployees re Budget Implications for the Department of Justice Workforce (Jan 21, 2011),
online at http://abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/AG%20Memo%20re%20Budget%20Implic
ations%20for%2Othe%20DOJ%2OWorkforce.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012). As a former
AUSA who worked through budget restrictions in the mid-2000s, I was not motivated by
the fact that qui tam relators and their attorneys who had done little work on "their"
lawsuits after filing the initial complaint were reaping huge rewards as a result of my
long hours on weekends without the benefit of air conditioning (in summer) or heat (in
winter). Thankfully, neither I nor other AUSAs are motivated by money.
9 For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requires an admin-
istrative charge to be filed before an individual can bring a lawsuit for Title VII employ-
ment discrimination. See 29 CFR § 1601.1 et seq.
98 DOJ, Fraud Statistics-Overview (cited in note 67). The DOJ and SEC have not
published their reasons for declining to intervene in whistleblower lawsuits. The biggest
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dictional requirement would also support the policies often artic-
ulated by the DOJ and the SEC-namely, crediting companies
whose compliance programs were designed to identify and reme-
diate wrongdoing.99 Congress could set a statutory period of time
for a company to internally investigate and remediate the prob-
lems identified by the whistleblower-perhaps one year-and if
the company failed to act promptly, the relator could be entitled
to recover a significant percentage of any judgment or settlement
amount. During the time a compliance department is conducting
its investigation, the statute of limitations for recovery could be
tolled, thus protecting the whistleblower if the target of his com-
plaint dragged its heels or otherwise acted in bad faith to reduce
the relator's recovery.
Accordingly, I propose that companies whose culture of com-
pliance is serious and meaningful should incentivize their em-
ployees themselves. If I am correct that some whistleblowers
would do the right thing for its own sake or for a reward less
than the millions of dollars routinely awarded, then companies
should be able to incentivize their employees to blow the whistle
internally for a more modest recovery. For example, a corpora-
tion could-as part of its existing and robust compliance pro-
gram-offer a financial reward to any employee who identifies
fraud and abuse. That company could additionally reward the
whistleblower with a promotion for his vigilance, or a tiered
prize, depending on the value of company savings earned by
ceasing fraudulent practices. In any case, the putative relator
could recover his bounty immediately and without the hassle of
finding and meeting with attorneys, filing a lawsuit, and waiting
years until the conclusion of his court case to get paid. As the
saying goes, a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.
III. CONCLUSION
A historical review demonstrates there is a need for private
attorneys general to assist the government in uncovering fraud
and abuse. While many entities strive to act with integrity, some
companies and individuals do not, and the government cannot be
everywhere at once. Nonetheless, while the goals of the FCA and
the Dodd-Frank whistleblower statute are laudable, they may be
reasons are likely lack of merit and lack of resources.
9 See, for example, DOJ, Principles of Federal Prosecution § 9-28.300 at 3-5 (cited in
note 83); US Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual §§ 8B2.1, 8C2.5(f)at512-17, 526
(cited in note 83); SEC, Enforcement Manual § 6.1.2 at 123-24 (cited in note 84).
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reached through means more consistent with historical priori-
ties: that is, returning as much money as possible to the govern-
ment that is entitled to it and not wasting resources to explore
meritless lawsuits. To achieve these goals more efficiently, whis-
tleblower rewards should be capped and relators should be incen-
tivized to report any fraud and abuse internally.
